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1   Introduction 
 
What are the aims of first-order moral inquiry, or normative inquiry more generally?                         
One aim is to specify which actions are right and which actions are wrong. But that’s                               
not enough; another aim is to ​explain ​why ​the right actions are right and the wrong                               
ones are wrong. 
How, more exactly, do such explanations work? On one natural view, the full                         
explanation of why a particular action was wrong (or right or good or bad, etc.)                             
involves two kinds of facts: (i) a particular ‘natural’ or ‘descriptive’ fact—perhaps it                         
was a lie, for instance, or failed to maximize well-being—and (ii) a general moral                           
fact—that it is wrong to lie, for instance, or to not maximize well-being. Call the latter                               
facts ​moral principles​. 
Despite the naturalness of this view, the precise nature and structure of the                         
relevant principles, and the form of explanation involved, is not yet well understood.                         
What’s more, the view that moral principles play an explanatory role has recently                         
been attacked. Selim Berker (forthcoming-a), for example, argues that moral                   
principles can instead be viewed as ​mere ​summaries of the explanatory relations that                         
obtain between particular moral and non-moral facts, with the principles themselves                     
being explanatorily inert. Similarly, Mark Schroeder (2005) argues that Ralph                   
Cudworth’s objection against theological voluntarism—which crucially involves             
appeal to explanatory moral principles—threatens to generalize so as to rule out the                         
possibility of “perfectly general explanatory moral theories” (2005, 3). 
Our aim in this paper is to defend the explanatory role of moral principles by                             
arguing that it best accommodates some intuitive claims about moral metaphysics.                     
Indeed, while we focus on morality, parallel claims are plausible with respect to                         
normative principles and explanations more generally. We begin by presenting the                     
relevant ‘data points’ (§2) before outlining, in general terms, how our favored view                         
captures them (§3). We then argue that the view that moral principles aren’t                         
explanatory in this way falls short (§4)—in particular, it fails to explain the                         
supervience of moral facts on ​natural facts. Next we discuss two competing accounts                         
of what, more precisely, moral principles are like: ​the nomic view ​(§5) and ​moral                           
1 Thanks to Selim Berker, Matti Eklund, David Faraci, Martin Glazier, Jaakko Hirvelä, John                           
Keller, David Mark Kovacs, Stephanie Leary, Michael Raven, Henrik Rydéhn, Jonathan                     
Shaheen, Knut Skarsaune, Bart Streumer, Mark van Roojen, Pekka Väyrynen, Daniel                     
Wodak, and audiences at UNC Chapel Hill, College of William & Mary, and University of                             
Wisconsin-Madison. Risberg’s work was supported by Helge Ax:son Johnson’s                 
Foundation, Hultengren’s Foundation, The Royal Swedish Academy of Letters, History                   
and Antiquities, The Salén Foundation, Sixten Gemzéus’ Foundation, Thun’s Grant                   
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 platonism ​(§6). Finally, we consider the sense in which moral principles are                       
metaphysically necessary (§7). 
 
2   The data 
 
We’ll begin by presenting three claims we think any fully satisfactory metaethical                       
theory should explain, or otherwise accommodate in a principled manner. Although                     
none are completely uncontroversial, theories that explain them will, other things                     
being equal, enjoy an advantage over those that don’t (and even more so over theories                             
which are incompatible with them). 
The first data point is that moral facts supervene upon purely natural (or                         
descriptive or whatever) facts. Suppose that Matti is a good person. Besides being                         
good, he also has numerous natural properties (including relational ones) that are                       
connected to goodness in the following way: anyone who is descriptively just like                         
Matti will also be good. Indeed, if Matti is good, it’s ​impossible for someone to possess                               
all and only his natural properties without also being good. Generalizing, the                       
supervenience relation that holds between ‘the natural’ and ‘the moral’ is standardly                       
formulated as follows, where ​M is the family of moral properties, ​N is the family of                               
natural properties, and ☐ is metaphysical necessity:  
Data point (i): ​Strong Supervenience 
(∀​F​ in ​M​)(∀​x​)[​Fx​ → (∃​G​ in ​N​)(​Gx​ & ☐(∀​y​)(​Gy​ → F​y​))]  2
In English: for every moral property ​F​, if something is ​F​, then that thing has                             
some (possibly quite complex!) natural property ​G such that, by metaphysical                     
necessity, everything that is ​G​ is also ​F​. 
Strong Supervenience has long been treated as something like a fixed point, though                         
recently it’s been called into question. We’ll nonetheless assume that its rejection                       3
comes as a cost. 
There are three things to note about Strong Supervenience. First, despite being                       
standardly glossed (as we did above) as expressing a relation between ‘the moral’ and                           
‘the natural’, the relevant pattern of covariation only concerns properties of ​particular                       
things. (The higher-order quantifiers quantify over moral and natural properties                   
while the first-order quantifiers quantify over particular bearers of those properties.)                     
We’ll return to this point. 
2 Cf. McPherson (2015), ​Leary (2017), Dreier (1992)​. Strong Supervenience is standardly                       
assumed to hold of necessity, either metaphysical or conceptual (or both). We assume it at                             
least holds of metaphysical necessity. 
3 See, e.g., Rosen (forthcoming)​, Fine (2005), Hattiangadi (2018), and Roberts (2018)​. Rosen                         
nonetheless remains committed to a form of supervenience that involves ‘normative’                     
rather than metaphysical necessity, and so faces the analogous task of explaining why it                           
holds. ​(For criticism of the notion of normative necessity, see Lange 2018) There are also                             
extreme forms of particularism which are incompatible with supervenience. Arguably,                   
however, such views are ​too​ extreme. 
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 Second, there’s controversy over how to characterize the supervenience base.                   
At a minimum, we assume the relevant family of properties (​N​) is closed under                           
property conjunction and property disjunction ​(cf. e.g. Bader 2017) and restricted to                       
repeatable properties (cf. Atiq forthcoming). In general, the goal is to strip base                         4
properties of their particularity. Although there are several additional complications,                   
everyone should acknowledge that there is some ​truth in the neighborhood, though                       
how exactly one formulates it may depend on one’s other commitments.  5
Third, Strong Supervenience doesn’t entail that particular moral facts are                   
explained by or obtain in virtue of natural facts. Indeed, supervenience claims in general                           
are silent as to which, if any, explanatory relations obtain between the relevant kinds                           
of facts. Nevertheless, the modal correlation specified by Strong Supervenience isn’t                     6
the only interesting relation that holds between particular moral and natural facts. An                         
explanatory relation also seems to hold: when (e.g.) a person is good or an action is                               
wrong, there are natural features of those entities that ​make ​the person good and the                             
action wrong. Hence the second data point: 
Data point (ii): ​Particular moral facts are at least partly (and at least                         
ultimately) explained by particular natural facts. 
We say ‘at least ultimately’ because some particular moral facts may obtain in virtue                           
of other particular moral facts. In such cases, those other moral facts are in turn                             
explained (at least ultimately) by particular natural facts.  7
4 Following Atiq (forthcoming), we can say that a property ​B is “repeatable” when,                           
necessarily, if ​x ​is ​B then it’s metaphysically possible for there to be an entity ​y ​such that ​y                                     
is distinct from ​x ​and ​y ​is ​B​. This rules out inclusion of haecceitistic properties, such the                                 
property of being Barack Obama. We agree with Atiq that an adequate account of the                             
supervenience base should entail that it is possible for distinct individuals to be                         
“base-identical”. This restriction may not give us everything we want, however, since                       
presumably we also want to rule out properties like that of being an Obama, which are                               
repeatable insofar as Barak has it, Michelle has it, etc., even though their “descriptive                           
twins” do not. (Thanks to Selim Berker for this point.) 
5 In particular, it is disputed how exactly one should characterize the family of subvenient                             
facts. Instead of “natural” or “descriptive” facts, some philosophers opt for (among other                         
things) “base” or “not-normativity-involving” facts. Which option that is most plausible                     
depends to a large extent on other metaethical issues, however (cf. Sturgeon (2009), so                           
we’re setting these questions aside. 
6 On the difference between supervenience and explanation, see DePaul (1987), Bliss and                         
Trogdon (2014), and Berker (2018). For dissent, see Kovacs (forthcoming). 
7 It may seem that some particular moral facts resist such explanation—for example,                         
consider the fact that Matti is such that if he tells a lie, then he does something prima facie                                     
wrong. Insofar as the explanation of such normative “Cambridge facts” differs from the                         
typical case, though, they seem to be exceptions to a general norm. Another particular                           
moral fact that may not seem to be explained by natural facts is the fact that the fact lying                                     
violates the Categorical Imperative is a reason against Matti’s lying yesterday. However,                       
reasons-claims arguably require separate treatment, since they themselves seem to be                     
explanatory claims of a certain kind (Fogal 2016), not entirely unlike claims about a                           
particular action being pro tanto right or ​wrong ​in virtue of ​a given natural fact. (Thanks to                                 
Selim Berker for (versions of) these apparent counterexamples.) 
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 Some additional clarifications are in order. First, what is meant by ‘particular                       
moral fact’? A particular moral fact is a moral fact about a particular (dated,                           
non-repeatable) thing, such as a particular action, person, or state of affairs. Besides                         
particular moral facts, there are also general, non-particular moral facts, such as that                         
pain is bad or that lying is pro tanto wrong. This intuitive distinction is surprisingly                             
often overlooked.​ ​For example, Pekka Väyrynen (2013) writes in a related context: 
 
[It] is very common to think that actions and other things have their                         
normative and evaluative properties ​in virtue of their non-normative,                 
non-evaluative properties. It is similarly very common for those who are                     
allergic to talk of normative properties nonetheless to agree that things are                       
good or bad, or right or wrong, ​because of some non-normative properties.                       
There is, in other words, a strong intuition that normative facts are dependent                         
on and explained by other facts. Call this ‘the dependence intuition’. (p. 155;                         
italics in original)  
 
Though we agree with the spirit of the dependence intuition, this is a potentially                           
misleading formulation of it insofar as it suggests that ​every ​moral (or normative) fact                           
is explained by other facts. This matters because while ​particular moral facts plausibly                         
depend (at least in part) on natural facts in this way, it’s far less clear that ​general                                 
moral facts—e.g., fundamental moral principles—also so depend. So while Väyrynen                   
is right that there’s a strong intuition in the vicinity, it only applies to a subset of the                                   
moral facts—i.e., the particular ones. We’ll return to this issue below. 
Second, what is meant by ‘explained’? The kind of explanation we have in                         
mind is ​metaphysical explanation (or what is commonly called ‘grounding’). One                     
distinguishing feature of such explanations is that they are non-causal. Suppose, for                       
example, that we want to know why the barn is red. There are at least two questions                                 8
we might be interested in. The first is what ​made it the case that the barn is red. The fact                                       
that, say, someone painted it yesterday would help provide an answer—it would help                         
causally explain why the barn is red. The second question concerns what presently                         
makes ​it the case that the barn is red. Here historical facts are irrelevant. Instead, what                               
matters are contemporaneous facts, such as the fact that the barn is crimson. This fact                             
non-causally explains why the barn is red. ,  9 10
We also take metaphysical explanation to be ​objective ​, roughly in the sense of                         
being mind- or stance-independent. Impressionistically put, objective explanations               11
involve explanatory relations—whether they be causal, nomic, metaphysical, or                 
something else—that obtain ‘out there’ in the world. This is different from the more                           
familiar, pragmatic notion of an explanation, understood as the sort of thing we                         
8 Cf. Glazier (2016, 11). 
9 We count present facts about the past and timeless facts as contemporaneous. 
10 Although causal explanations are paradigmatically diachronic and non-causal 
explanations are paradigmatically synchronic, there may be exceptions. 
11 We treat this as a stipulation. It’s therefore immune to challenges by Thompson (2016)                             
and Miller and Norton (forthcoming), who seem to collapse the ‘makes sense of why’ vs.                             
‘makes it the case’ distinction. 
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 standardly ask for and provide concerning a variety of subject matters (and which can                           
in that sense be causal or non-causal), and whose success depends on “facts about the                             
interests, beliefs or other features of the psychology of those providing or receiving                         
the explanation [or] the ‘context’ in which the explanation occurs” (Woodward 2014,                       
§6.1). In slogan form, we can distinguish between ‘explains’ in the sense of ​makes it the                               
case ​and ‘explains’ in the sense of ​makes sense of why it’s the case. Although knowing                               12
what made or makes something the case will often help make sense of why it’s the                               
case, objective and pragmatic explanations are not neatly aligned. 
It might be objected that focusing on metaphysical explanation prejudges                   
certain metaethical disputes, such as whether expressivism is true. Insofar as there’s a                         
conflict, however, the problem lies with those views. After all, everyone needs a story                           
about the metaphysical-seeming judgments we make about moral matters, including                   
judgments about what makes actions right, wrong, etc. If expressivists can provide                       
such a story, the seeming conflict disappears. If they can’t, that’s a problem for their                             13
view. 
The third clarification concerns what is meant by ‘partly explains’. The                     
relevant contrast here is the notion of a ​full explanation. Almost all the explanations                           
we actually provide—i.e. pragmatic explanations—are partial rather than full. If you                     
purchase a pet, and someone asks you why, you might say that you’re lonely. While                             
sensible as a reply, the fact that you’re lonely doesn’t ​by itself ​explain your purchase.                             
Instead, its explanatory import depends on a bunch of background facts that are taken                           
for granted, such as that you don’t want to be lonely, that you believe a pet will make                                   
you less lonely, etc. Your loneliness is thus only a part, and indeed a rather small part,                                 
of what fully explains your action. This illustrates a general feature of our explanatory                           
practice: rather than providing a full explanation, we’re typically content to highlight                       
one or two notable factors, trusting our interlocutors to fill in the rest. Providing the                             
full explanatory story is typically laborious, if possible at all, and unnecessary. 
Here, finally, is our third data point: 
Data point (iii): ​Moral principles are explanatory in nature. 
This claim is motivated, in part, by the observation that a moral theory merely                           
consisting of a ​list of all particular actions that are right or wrong is incomplete. We                               
also want to know ​why they’re on the list. General moral principles answer that                           
question. 
Some care is needed, however. For as Berker (forthcoming-a) notes, moral                     
principles might be explanatory in either of two ways. Suppose it’s always wrong to                           
lie. According to Berker, this principle is explanatory only in the sense that it specifies                             
a natural property—i.e., being a lie—such that any particular act with that property is                           
wrong fully because it is a lie. On this view, moral principles can be viewed as mere                                 
summaries ​of patterns of particular explanatory relations, with the principles                   
themselves being explanatorily inert. As we’ll put it, such principles are merely                       
12 More nuance is called for, but we lack space to provide it. Suffice it to say, ordinary                                   
explanation-talk is both messy and context-sensitive (cf. Lewis 1986; Jenkins 2008). 
13 For discussion, see Berker (forthcoming-b) and Toppinen (2018). 
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 explanatory in content​—they specify ​which particular natural facts explain which                   
particular moral facts and that’s it. Berker’s view thus resembles ‘Humean’ accounts                       
of laws of nature, according to which natural laws are mere summaries of patterns                           
among particulars. Yet the view is also ​non​-Humean insofar as the relevant patterns                         
involve instantiations of a hyperintensional explanatory relation, not mere                 
co-occurrence of distinct facts or properties. This view—call it ​Hyperintensional                   
Humeanism​—is effectively what you get if you take data point (ii), which concerns the                           
explanation of particular moral facts by natural facts, to be more fundamental than                         
data point (iii), which concerns the explanatory nature of moral principles. The salient                         
alternative is that the truth of the principle that lying is wrong ​itself ​plays a role in                                 
explaining particular moral facts involving lying, with the fact that the action was a lie                             
only partly explaining why it’s wrong. On this view, moral principles are ​explanatory                         
in ​role—​they themselves help explain particular moral facts. Data point (iii) is                       14
neutral with respect to whether such principles are explanatory in role or in content. 
 
3   Explaining the data 
 
To recap, here are the data points: 
 
Data point (i): ​Strong Supervenience—for every moral property ​F ​, if                   
something is ​F​, then that thing has some natural property ​G such that, by                           
metaphysical necessity, everything that is ​G​ is also ​F​. 
Data point (ii): ​Particular moral facts are at least partly explained by natural                         
facts. 
Data point (iii): ​Moral principles are explanatory in nature. 
 
A unified account of these data points is desirable. The most natural way of providing                             
one is to view some data points as more fundamental than others. But which ones? 
We doubt (i) is most fundamental. As is standardly recognized, supervenience                     
is “not a ‘deep’ metaphysical relation” but “a ‘surface’ relation that reports a pattern                           
of property covariation, suggesting the presence of an interesting dependency relation                     
that might explain it” (Kim 1993: 167). Supervenience theses thus ​call for explanation                         
rather than provide them. So ideally, (i) can be accounted for in terms of (ii) or (iii) or                                   
both. 
We think the best way of making sense of (i) is by opting for the package of                                 
(ii) together with the interpretation of (iii) on which moral principles are explanatory                         
in role. On this view, explanations of particular moral facts involve three main                         
ingredients: 
 
Explanans:​ particular natural fact(s) (e.g. ​a ​ is a lie). 
Principle:​ general explanatory moral principle (e.g. lying is wrong). 
Explanandum:​ particular moral fact (e.g. ​a ​ is wrong). 
 




 The explanandum is fully explained by the explanans together with the moral                       
principle, though (as we’ll see) the exact role played by principles will depend partly                           
on how they are formulated. But for now this outline of the tripartite structure of                             
moral explanations will suffice. 
Alternative terminological choices might be made. Schaffer (2017a), for                 
example, emphasizes the importance of the tripartite structure of metaphysical                   
explanations by distinguishing between the ‘source’, ‘link’, and ‘result’ in an                     
explanation. As he notes, when “there are three roles involved, nothing but confusion                         
can arise from insisting on only using two classificatory boxes” (20). Causal                       
explanations illustrate this point: while causal laws plausibly help explain particular                     
effects, laws aren’t themselves causes. Causes and laws play different roles in the full                           
explanation of whatever is caused. We agree, although we’ve supplemented the                     
explanans​/​explanandum ideology rather than jettison it. 
The tripartite account of moral explanations incorporates data points (ii) and                     
(iii): particular moral facts are explained by particular natural facts together with                       
general moral principles. Given the substantive but plausible assumption that the                     15
fundamental moral principles obtain of metaphysical necessity (if at all), making                     
sense of strong supervenience—data point (i)—is straightforward. (We’ll return to                   
this assumption in §7.) We’ll call this the ​Divide & Conquer ​(or ​D&C​) ​strategy.  
Essentially, Strong Supervenience states that the moral properties of some                   
particular things cannot differ unless their natural properties differ. On the tripartite                       
account, the moral properties of particular things depend on two things: (a) which                         
natural properties they have and (b) which moral principles obtain. Regarding (a), it’s                         
trivial that two things cannot differ in their natural properties without differing in                         
their natural properties. Regarding (b), it’s also trivial that two things cannot differ                         
with respect to which moral principles obtain, because such principles can’t differ                       
period​—they obtain of necessity and so trivially supervene on everything. Hence, a                       
particular thing’s moral properties depend on two things—(a) and (b)—both of which                       
15 Our account thus resembles what Schroeder (2005) calls “the Standard Model” of                         
normative explanations​, where such explanations “[subsume] specific obligations in                 
context to more general obligations, by appeal to specific features of the agent’s                         
circumstances” (2014, 3). [A]lthough we agree this is an intuitive idea, ​we think the                           
tripartite account is more perspicuous ​than Schroeder’s Standard Model. Especially                     
important here is the distinction between particular and general normative facts (cf. sect.                         
2), since some of Schroeder’s discussion seems to overlook it. For example, Schroeder                         
apparently holds that every “perfectly general explanatory moral theory” is in the                       
business of explaining why particular agents ought to perform certain action-types (2005,                       
3). What we perform in the first instance, however, are ​token ​actions, and the moral status                               
of such actions is also—arguably even primarily—something moral theories should                   
explain. Other times, something like the general-particular distinction figures in                   
Schroeder’s discussion of the Standard Model, but is not clearly separated from other                         
distinctions, such as the one between explained and unexplained moral facts, or the one                           
between moral facts that are ‘wholly distinct’ from non-moral facts and those that aren’t                           
(cf. ‘pure’ moral facts; 2014, ch. 6). Contra Schroeder, then, we doubt the Standard                           
Model—at least as he formulates it—is widely accepted among moral philosophers.                     




 supervene on the thing’s natural properties for trivial reasons. It’s therefore no                       
surprise that moral properties of particular things can’t differ unless their natural                       
properties differ.  16
We take the claim just explained to be the ‘core’ supervenience claim. But as                           
David Faraci (2017) emphasizes, Strong Supervenience also entails a ​necessitation                   
claim: no particular thing can have a moral property unless it also has some natural                             
property. Making sense of this isn’t difficult, however, as its falsity would require                         
something to have a moral property without having any natural properties at all. And                           
given the very broad sense of ‘natural’ at issue, this seems impossible. Every action,                           
for example, will at least have the natural property of being an action, however                           
featureless it might otherwise be. Similarly, Cartesian souls, even if empirically                     
inaccessible, will still have properties such as being conscious, or, indeed, being                       
Cartesian souls. This suggests that every particular thing will have some natural                       
property or other, and ​a fortiori ​, that every particular thing with a moral property will                             
also have a natural property.  17
It might be worried that an account of Strong Supervenience that posits                       
non-contingent explanatory moral principles fails to make genuine progress, since                   
such principles merely restate (in a slightly different guise) the problematic truth that                         
was supposed to be accounted for. But that’s false: supervenience theses say nothing                         18
about explanation, so principles concerning the latter can’t be restatements of the                       
former. 
Although several recent explanations of supervenience resemble the D&C                 
strategy, none are fully satisfactory. Enoch (2011), for instance, takes the basic                       
normative facts to be “norms” that hold with metaphysical necessity, and thereby                       
explain Strong Supervenience. But Enoch says little about what norms are or how                         
they explain particular normative facts. We’ll consider some answers to this question                       
in §§5-6. One account takes the fundamental moral facts to concern ​kinds ​rather than                           19
particulars. Both Skarsaune (2015) and, more briefly, Schroeder (2014, §6.6) appeal to                       
this idea in explanations of supervenience, though neither pays sufficient attention to                       
data points (ii) and (iii). Scanlon (2014), in contrast, holds that supervenience is                         
explained by “pure” normative facts of the form ‘∀x(​R​(​p​, ​x​, ​c​, ​a ​))’, which reads: for all                               
agents ​x​, in circumstance ​c​, fact ​p is a reason to do ​a​. However, for reasons discussed                                 
in §4, the use of universal generalisations in formulating moral principles is                       
problematic.​  20
16 At least in general, if ​X​ depends on ​Y​ and ​Y​ trivially supervenes on ​Z​ then it should be 
no surprise that ​X​ supervenes on ​Z​. 
17 We suspect Faraci’s real concern is why it’s “impossible for normative properties to be                             
ungrounded” (2017, 315)—i.e., data point (ii), not (i). 
18  Cf. McPherson (2012) on “bruteness revenge”. 
19 Enoch (forthcoming) advocates a form of ‘grounding pluralism’. For reasons to be                         
skeptical, see Enoch (forthcoming), n. 21. In our view, the best way to develop Enoch’s                             
2011 account is instead along the lines that we’ll consider in section 5. 
20 Schroeder (2015) suggests that the quantifier and the person variable x are redundant,                           
and that Scanlon's proposal can be read ‘R(p, c, a)’ without loss. And indeed, that is the                                 
formulation Scanlon uses in the manuscript for his 2009 Locke Lectures, on which the                           
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 While the proposals just considered are all pursued in defense of some form                         
of non-naturalism, the D&C strategy itself is neutral regarding the                   
naturalism/non-naturalism dispute, and indeed regarding most other metaethical               
disputes. In particular, even if it’s always possible to explain why a particular thing                           
has a certain moral property, it doesn't follow that the moral properties                       
themselves—i.e., ​what it is to have a certain moral property—can be explained.                       21
That’s a point of contention dividing naturalists and non-naturalists, and one to be                         
decided on other grounds. More generally, the D&C strategy is neutral concerning the                         
status, specific content, number, complexity, and explanation (if any) of the relevant                       
moral principles. This is a feature, not a bug: it focuses the debate precisely where it                               
should be (and to some extent always has been)—namely, on the fundamental moral                         
principles, if such there be.  
Given the foregoing, the attention garnered by Strong Supervenience (and its                     
ilk) in recent decades looks rather misplaced. It has often been held, for example, that                             
non-naturalists have a hard time explaining moral supervenience. But if the D&C                       
strategy is successful, that’s false. This is just one example of how focusing on                           
supervenience while neglecting the more fundamental data points (ii) and (iii) can be                         
distorting. Other examples are furnished by various attempted explanations of                   
supervenience—many of which are naturalist-friendly—that are either silent about or,                   
worse, in tension with the other data points. To illustrate: 
● Naturalistic identity-theses make sense of supervenience but are harder to                   
reconcile with the data points about moral explanation—i.e. (ii) and (iii).                     
Although things that differ morally must differ naturally if moral properties                     
just ​are natural properties, if rightness is, say, identical to                   
happiness-maximizing, it’s hard to see how actions can be right ​in virtue of                         
being happiness-maximizing, since nothing explains itself. ​(cf. McNaughton &                 
Rawling 2003) 
● Expressivist explanations of supervenience have often centered on the idea                   
that our moral practice wouldn’t fulfill its ‘function’ of, e.g., coordinating                     
behavior if our moral views didn’t respect supervenience (cf. Blackburn 1984).                     
For example, Mitchell (2017) attributes to Blackburn the view that “it is                       
practically necessary that everyone conform their evaluations to a                 
supervenience constraint: without it, we lapse into practical and discursive                   
chaos…”. ​Even if this thesis makes sense of supervenience, it’s silent                     
concerning data points (ii) and (iii). 
book is based. Thus understood, Scanlon's view is a version of platonism, which we                           
discuss in section 6. 
21 As Leary (ms) argues, this distinction was recognized by G.E. Moore (1942, 588). See                             
also Rydéhn (2019) on “opaque grounding” (which we’ll return to below) and Rosen                         
(2010, sect. 13) on “Moorean connections”. By distinguishing between explaining why                     
something is ​F ​and explaining what it is to be ​F​, we think one can also avoid Berker’s                                   
revisionary result that “almost all contemporary metaethical views (other than nihilism)                     
end up counting as a form of non-naturalism about the normative” (forthcoming-a, 29)                         
and Heathwood’s (2012) related view. 
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 While there are various things adherents of such views might say in response, our                           
main complaint concerns the focus of the debate. For as Berker (2018) argues, the                           22
notion of moral supervenience was first introduced and motivated with reference to                       
claims concerning ​both ​co-variance—data point (i)—and explanation—data point (ii).                 
In one of the earliest discussions, for example, R. M. Hare notes that if two things                               
differ in goodness “there must be some further difference between them to ​make one                           
good and the other not…” (1952, 81; emphasis added). The modal formalizations of                         
supervenience that subsequently became dominant replaced this dual-focus with a                   
single-minded one—they express co-variation claims and that’s it. This coincided                   
with general philosophical suspicion of heavier-weight notions like metaphysical                 
explanation, but times have changed. Both of Hare’s original motivations are relevant,                       
and accounts that don’t make sense of moral explanations fail to capture what                         
motivated the focus on supervenience in the first place. 
To sum up so far: taking moral principles to be explanatory in role helps                           
provide a unified account of the data points. The next task is to investigate the nature                               
and structure of such principles. Doing so is not straightforward—for as we’ll see, the                           
most common way to formulate moral principles makes it hard to see how they could                             
be explanatory in role, rather than merely in content. 
 
4   Moral principles are not merely explanatory in content 
 
Moral principles are commonly formulated as universal generalizations. Berker                 
(forthcoming-a) defends this view, arguing that “the most naive way of formulating                       
moral principles (…) is also the best, namely one that uses no materials other than a                               
wide-scope necessity operator, standard quantification, mundane indicative             
conditionals, and the full grounding [i.e. metaphysical explanation] relation” (26). The                     
utilitarian principle is thus formulated as follows (‘B’ for ‘Berker’): 
 
(U​B​) Necessarily, an action is required if and only if, and fully because, it                         
maximizes happiness. 
 
It’ll be useful to pay attention to some details of this formulation. While Berker says                             
statements like this one are necessitated universal generalizations, or necessitated                   
universally generalized indicative (bi)conditionals, (U​B​) doesn’t explicitly involve               
22 For example, in order to make progress in explaining data point (ii), expressivists might                             
help themselves to the account of normative explanation suggested by Berker                     
(forthcoming-b)—of which both he and we are ultimately skeptical. It’s also possible to                         
simply deny one of our data points and seek to explain away the relevant intuition(s). As                               
noted above, however, we think such views will be less plausible, other things being                           
equal. For example, while our concern has been the broadly metaphysical sense of                         
‘explains’, there may be other senses of the word that advocates of identity theses can                             
invoke if they want to say that some facts explain themselves. For instance, one might say                               
‘Joe is a bachelor because he is an unmarried eligible male’ in attempting to elucidate the                               
notion of a bachelor (see Kovacs 2018, sect. 4). The present point is just that moral                               
explanations don’t strike us as mere attempts at elucidation. We’ll return to the relation                           
between explanatory and identificational claims in section 6.1. 
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 universal generalization. Rather, it uses the indefinite ‘an action’ which (as we’ll                       
further discuss in §5.1) can be used in importantly different ways. Let’s nonetheless                         
assume that (U​B​) can be paraphrased as follows: 
 
(U​B​*) Necessarily, for all actions ​x​, ​x is required if and only if, and fully                           
because, ​x​ maximizes happiness. 
 
(U​B​*) states a general fact—call it ‘[U​B​*]’—that is explanatory in content, but not role:                           
it states that whenever some particular action is morally required, that fact is fully                           
‘grounded’ in its maximizing happiness. Given the common assumption that                   23
universal generalizations obtain at least partly in virtue of their instances, [U​B​*]                       
obtains (if at all) in virtue of ​this ​action being required because it maximizes                           
happiness, ​that ​action being required because it maximizes happiness, and so on for                         
each possible required action (perhaps together with a totality fact). [U​B​*] thus                       
24
summarizes, and is explained by, instantiations of the grounding relation between                     
particular facts about happiness-maximizing and particular facts about moral                 
obligatoriness—[U​B​*] itself plays no explanatory role. Indeed, given that                 
25
metaphysical explanations are irreflexive and transitive, [U​B​*] ​can’t explain the facts                     
about moral obligatoriness. This gets us Hyperintensional Humeanism, per above. 
The problem, however, is that Hyperintensional Humeanism has trouble                 
making sense of supervenience—i.e. data point (i). To see why, let ​D be the set of                               
Matti’s natural properties. Assuming he’s good, Strong Supervenience allows us to                     
infer that every other possible entity with the properties in ​D is also good. But if we                                 
take (ii) to be more fundamental than (iii), it’s not clear why that inference is sound.                               
On Berker’s view, there are some natural properties in ​D such that the fact that Matti                               
has those properties fully explains the fact that he’s good. Call those natural                         
properties ​D​*. Given ​grounding necessitarianism​—i.e., the thesis that if some facts ​Γ                       
fully explain the fact [​Q ​], then it’s necessary that if ​Γ obtain then [​Q​] obtains—it                             
follows that, necessarily, if Matti is ​D​* then he is good. But it doesn’t follow that if,                                 26
say, ​Folke has the properties in ​D (and thus the ones in ​D​*) then Folke is good. That’s                                   
23 Following Berker (following Rosen), we’ll use square brackets to denote facts. We’ll also                           
sometimes use them to denote fact schemata—context will disambiguate. 
24 It’s actually a hard question what the ‘instances’ of [U​B​*] are, though one we can’t ​fully                                 
address here. ​For instance, rather than facts of the form [​x is required because ​a is                               
happiness-maximizing], it might be better to view instances of [U​B​*] as particular facts of                           
the form [​x is required if and only if and because ​a is happiness-maximizing]. This would                               
complicate things, however, especially if such facts can obtain even if the relevant action ​is                             
neither happiness-maximizing nor required. Fortunately these sorts of complications have                   
little bearing on the question of whether Berker’s view makes sense of supervenience. 
25 This is true even when the relevant universal generalizations are ‘non-accidental’ and                         
necessitated. For this reason we are skeptical of various formulations floated by Rosen                         
(2017). ​Rosen focuses on formulations of laws that have the form ​☐​∀​x​(​Gx ​→ ​Fx​), where ​G                               
is a descriptive property, ​F is a normative property, the arrow stands for material                           
conditional, and the box stands for so-called ‘normative necessity’. 
26 Grounding necessitarianism is not universally accepted (see, e.g., Leuenberger 2014 and                       
Skiles 2015). But in this context, rejecting necessitarianism would only make it more                         
difficult to see how Berker’s view could make sense of why Strong Supervenience is true. 
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 because Berker takes the grounding relation to hold between wholly particular                     
natural facts (e.g., that Matti is ​D​*) and wholly particular moral facts (e.g., that Matti                             
is good). As a result, nothing entitles us to generalize from facts about the natural and                               
moral properties of one particular entity to those of another. In other words, even if                             
the ​properties in ​D ​are repeatable, the ​subjects ​instantiating them—i.e, Matti and                       
Folke—remain particular and non-repeatable. And generalizations from facts about                 
one particular to another is precisely what the supervenience thesis captures: if                       
someone with the properties in ​D​ is good, then ​anyone ​with those properties is good. 
Of course, ​if a principle like (U​B​*) is true for goodness, it follows that goodness                             
supervenes on the natural properties specified by that principle. But the point is that                           
given Berker’s underlying metaphysics, there’s no reason to expect there to be true                         
principles of that form, and hence no reason to expect supervenience to be true.                           
Whether going from the wholly particular to the general secures such principles                       
depends on what the various patterns among wholly particular facts across possible                       
worlds happen to look like. Hence, the Hyperintensional Humean’s principles (and                     
thus supervenience) ends up hostage to a kind of modal miracle.  
In other words, although principles like (U​B​*), if true, would secure                     
supervenience, they would do so in the wrong way—rather than being made sense of                           
in a principled fashion, it would still look like a mystery that the Humean mosaic                             
necessarily turns out to give rise to them. This worry resembles some of the                           
traditional complaints in the literature on moral supervenience, though the present                     
situation is in one regard even worse. For while the traditional worry is that it’s                             27
mysterious why particular moral facts should necessarily align with particular natural                     
facts in the way specified by Strong Supervenience, the worry now concerns not only                           
those facts but also particular instances of the grounding-relation between them. 
In response, Hyperintensional Humeans might appeal to a principle like                   
Formality (Rosen 2010, 131). Simplifying somewhat, this principle states that [ ​a is ​F​]                         
fully grounds [​a is ​G​] only if any fact of the form [ ​x is ​F​] fully grounds [​x is ​G​]. Given                                         
Formality, the fact that Matti is good because he is ​D​* entails that Folke is also good                                 
because he is ​D​*. However, the same problem seems to arise. For why should                           
Hyperintensional Humeans expect Formality to be true? Given their other                   
commitments, they cannot consistently claim that this general principle (or something                     
like it) is ​itself ​explanatory in role. Instead, whether Formality is true would also seem                             
to depend on what the modal mosaic happens to look like. Rather than vindicating                           
Strong Supervenience, then, Formality is hostage to the same sort of modal miracle. 
These problems are avoided if moral principles are explanatory in role. On                       
this view, Matti’s being ​D ​* doesn’t fully explain why he’s good—a general moral                         
principle also plays a role. If particular facts about goodness are always partly                         
explained by such principles, it’s clear why we can infer that Folke, who is also ​D​,                               
must likewise be good. So we not only get Strong Supervenience but also a                           
27 See, e.g., Skarsaune (2015, 267). ​There are also other worries about supervenience which                           
we don’t have in mind here—for instance, the one associated with Blackburn (1984) that                           




 counterpart of Formality—at least in the moral case—for more-or-less the same                     
reasons.  28
The arguments just given rely on several assumptions which could be                     
rejected, such as that (necessitated) universal generalizations are explained by their                     
(non-necessitated) instances, that (U​B​) is correctly paraphrased as a universal                   
generalization, and so on. But once these assumptions are rejected, it becomes unclear                         
what the Hyperintensional Humean view is, and whether the main ingredients in                       
principles like (U​B​)—i.e. “standard” quantification, indicative conditionals, and so                 
on—are really as “naive” as Berker claims them to be. We won’t consider those                           
questions here. Instead, in what follows we’ll focus on two accounts that treat moral                           
principles as explanatory in role, rather than merely in content.   
 
5   The nomic view of moral explanations 
 
The nomic view of moral explanations is modeled on what we’ll call the law-based                           
view of grounding explanations. By ‘grounding explanations’ we mean cases in which                       
a particular fact obtains in virtue of others (its ‘grounds’), with the latter being more                             
fundamental than the former. Standard examples include: 
 
(i) Mental facts obtain because of neurophysiological facts. 
(ii) The fact that the ball is red and round obtains in virtue of the fact that it is red                                     
and the fact that it is round. 
(iii) Socrates was pale because he was this specific skin tone. 
 
The nature of grounding explanations is a matter of controversy. One issue concerns                         
the existence of general metaphysical principles, or ‘laws’, and what role (if any) they                           
play. According to the law-based view, metaphysical laws play an ineliminable role in                         
grounding explanations. On this view, the full metaphysical account of, say, Socrates’                       
being pale extends beyond his having a certain skin tone—the general fact that having                           
that skin tone makes one pale is also relevant. 
Even if metaphysical laws exist and play an explanatory role, the precise role                         
they play is disputed. Should we treat laws as ​part of grounding explanations, for                           
example, or instead as merely ‘underlying’ or ‘backing’ or ‘governing’ such                     
explanations? (And what’s the difference?) We’ll set such questions aside. What                     
matters for our purposes is what unites law-based theorists—namely, that                   
metaphysical laws play ​some essential role in metaphysical explanations. The                   
law-based view of grounding explanations can thus be seen as a generalized version                         
of the tripartite view of moral explanations above:   
28 In support of Formality, Rosen notes that it seems “particular grounding facts must                           
always be subsumable under general laws… It would be interesting to know why this is                             
so.” (2010, 132) The idea that the general laws are explanatory in role is, we think, a                                 
natural answer to this question. 
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 Grounds:​ particular fact(s). 
Metaphysical Law:​ general explanatory principle. 
Explanandum:​ particular fact. 
 
Discussions about grounding explanations are complicated, however, by the fact that                     
the word ‘ground(s)’ is often used in different ways. For some, for ​A to ground ​B is                                 
for ​A to metaphysically explain ​B​, whereas for others, for ​A to ground ​B is for there to                                   
be a metaphysical relation between ​A and ​B that ‘backs’ explanations. What's more,                         29
many theorists—including Berker—take the grounding relation to hold between                 
particular facts. But on the law-based view, it’s a mistake to focus exclusively on                           
relations between particular facts, just as on law-based views of causal explanation it’s                         
a mistake to focus exclusively on relations between individual events. In both cases                         
laws also matter. To minimize confusion we’ll mostly avoid using ‘ground(s)’ as a                         
verb, preferring instead to use it as a noun to pick out the explanan(s) of grounding                               
explanations (per above) on analogy with the use of ‘cause(s)’ as a noun. (This                           
terminological issue will re-arise in responding to Berker in §5.1.) 
While the law-based view of grounding explanations is plausible, we won’t be                       
defending it here. Our primary concern is instead with the nomic view of moral                           30
explanations. What motivates the nomic view is the idea that the general principles or                           
‘laws’ that help explain moral facts should be understood in the same way as those                             
thought (rightly or wrongly) to figure in grounding explanations elsewhere. The main                       
difference is that moral laws involve moral properties whereas non-moral laws                     
don’t—a difference in content rather than form. Although the nomic view is a natural                           
companion to the law-based view, neither entails the other. One might accept the                         
nomic view while rejecting the law-based view in general; alternatively, one might                       
accept the law-based view while rejecting the nomic view (by, e.g., denying that                         
moral explanations are grounding explanations). 
How, then, are metaphysical and/or moral laws to be understood? There are                       
different ways of trying to capture their characteristic features, such as their                       
generality and directionality, but the proposal we find most congenial is from Glazier                         
(2016). He writes: 
 
[A metaphysical law] clearly has a sort of generality, but it is a general fact that is                                 
not explained by its instances. Since this sort of generality is not achieved through                           
quantification, it must instead be achieved through another variable-binding                 
operator. I therefore propose that we recognize a new operator ‘<<’ [that] bind[s]                         
any number of variables, since our intuitive understanding of a general                     
metaphysical-explanatory connection does not support any relevant limit. And                 
because a fact may be metaphysically explained by any number of other facts, the                           
operator should also be variably polyadic ‘on the left’. (25) 
 
Thus, according to Glazier, a statement of a law will be of the form 
 
29 Raven (2015) calls the first view ‘unionism’ and the second view ‘separatism’. 
30 Instead, see Kment (2014), Wilsch (2016), Glazier (2016), and Schaffer (2017a, 2017b). 
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 φ​1​,..., ​φ​n​ <<​α1​,…, ​αm​ ψ 
 
where ​φ​1​,…, ​φ​n​, ​ψ are sentences, and ​α​1​,…,α​m are variables that the ‘<<’-operator                           
binds. We can therefore express the law connecting, say, an arbitrary thing’s being                         
crimson and its being red as: 
 
Crimson​: x​ is crimson <<​x​ ​x ​ is red 
 
In terms of facts: ​Crimson ​states the general explanatory connection that holds                       
between facts of the form [​x ​is crimson] and facts of the form [​x ​is red]. This                                 
connection obtains non-vacuously even in possible worlds in which nothing is either                       
crimson or red. 
Though Glazier doesn’t discuss moral principles, the nomicist can use the                     
‘<<’-operator to formulate the utilitarian principle as follows (‘N’ for ‘Nomic’): 
 
(U​N​) x​ maximizes happiness <<​x​ ​x ​ is morally required 
 
(U​N​) states the general explanatory connection that holds between facts of the form [​x                           
maximizes happiness] and facts of the form [​x is morally required]. Other principles                         
can be formulated similarly. The nomic view is thus an independently-motivated                     
implementation of the tripartite view of moral explanations presented in §3, thereby                       
capturing data points (i)-(iii) as desired. 
 
5.1   Berker’s objections 
 
Berker (forthcoming-a) considers but rejects the nomic view of moral explanations.                     
One worry concerns the relationship between metaphysics and language. He writes: 
 
[It] is basically impossible to express [Glazier’s] operator in natural language.                     
Such a result would be surprising (…) Natural language is like water: over time it                             
tends to adjust itself and flow toward the metaphysically and normatively                     
relevant cracks in nature. (24) 
 
Following this analogy, Berker urges “caution when there is such a large disconnect                         
between a posited fundamental feature of reality and the everyday language with                       
which we talk about that reality.” (24) 
We take the analogy with water to be inapt. Carnap (1963) provides a better                           
analogy: 
 
[N]atural language is like a crude, primitive pocket knife, very useful for a                         
hundred different purposes. But for certain specific purposes, special tools are                     
more efficient (…) If we find that the pocket knife is too crude for a given purpose                                 
and creates deficient products, we shall try to discover the cause for the failure,                           
and then either use the knife more skillfully, or replace it for this special purpose                             




That is, natural language has many virtues, but for specialized purposes—like                     
describing fundamental features of reality—it often fails to constitute the best tool.                       
Fortunately, its adaptability and flexibility enables us to give voice to novel concepts                         
easily, whether by introducing a new term or else by giving an old term a new                               
meaning. In neither case does natural language adjust itself so as to “flow toward the                             
metaphysically relevant cracks in nature”—​we ​ adjust ​it ​ to do that.  
The same is true of the generality that is characteristic of laws. While Berker                           
may be right that “English doesn’t mark a difference between the sort of generality                           
featured in [‘That an action breaks a promise makes it the case that it is prima facie                                 
wrong’] and the sort featured in a sentence such as ‘That an action breaks a promise is                                 
not something its agent always knows’” (forthcoming: 25), we don’t view this as an                           
obstacle or an objection. It’s a familiar point that simplicity of surface grammar often                           
masks a multitude of ways in which a sentence can be used. For example, sentences of                               
the form ‘A(n) ​F is ​G​’ can plausibly be used to express universal generalizations (‘A                             
human can’t fly’), exception-permitting generalizations (‘A dog has four legs’), claims                     
about specific individuals (‘A cat is over there’), and full or partial definitions (‘A                           
bachelor is an unmarried male’, ‘A vixen is a fox’). The indefinite is also used to                               
express variable-binding term operators like Hilbert’s ε ​(cf. Woods 2014), and                     
arbitrary reference more generally (e.g. ‘Let John be a German’; cf. Breckenridge &                         
Magidor 2012). So: we can do lots of stuff with indefinites. Definitions are particularly                           
relevant, since—as we’ll see in §6.1—they seem to involve the same kind of generality                           
that laws do and similarly require special-purpose operators for perspicuous                   
representation.  
Berker has a second objection. As he notes, “Glazier often summarizes his                       
proposed laws using ‘makes the case’-talk, which he takes to be a ‘generic                         
placeholder’ that ‘perhaps… should be replaced by something like ‘determines’ or                     
even ‘grounds’’” (Berker forthcoming-a, 24). If we take such glosses seriously, we                       
might think that (U​N​) can be reformulated as follows: 
 
(U​N​*) That an action maximizes happiness makes it the case that it is                       
morally required. 
 
However, if ‘makes it the case’ in (U​N​*) picks out the grounding-relation, Berker                         
thinks we face a dilemma. If this locution denotes ​full grounding, the moral principle                           
becomes explanatorily redundant—the fact that the action maximized happiness by                   
itself fully explains that it is right. On the other hand, if ‘makes it the case’ only                                 
denotes ​partial grounding, Berker thinks (U​N​*) ceases to qualify as a statement of                         
moral law, since when looking for such laws “we are looking for [a] specification of ​all                               
the partial grounds” (25). On this horn, Berker thinks, (U​N​) is better informally put as                             
follows: 
 
(U​N​**) That an action maximizes happiness, together with this very moral                   




 But this is metaphysically circular​. ​And that’s implausible. The upshot is that whether                         
we take ‘makes it the case’ to denote full or partial grounding, the view that moral                               
principles are explanatory in role runs into trouble. 
There’s a lot that might be said in response to Berker’s dilemma. We’ll limit                           
ourselves to two remarks. To begin with, we need to be careful with                         31
‘ground(s)’/‘makes-it-the-case’-talk. On the law-based view, grounding explanations             
have a tripartite structure: grounds, general explanatory principle, and explanandum.                   
If ‘fully grounds’ means ‘constitutes the explanans and connection of’, then Berker is                         
right that (U​N​) doesn’t entail that A​’s maximizing happiness fully grounds ​A ​’s being                         
morally required. But (U​N​) still legitimately ‘qualifies as a statement of moral law’                         
since it specifies all the relevant (i.e. particular-level) explanantia, or what we earlier                         
called ‘grounds’. If, on the other hand, ‘fully grounds’ means ‘constitutes the                       
explanans (but not the connection)’, then the entailment may well hold. But we’ll still                           
need an explanatory connection, and it’s not clear why (U​N​) couldn’t state that                         
connection without redundancy. 
Regarding the second horn, we think the nomicist is within their rights taking                         
the notion of metaphysical law as an ideological primitive. So although something                       
like (U​N​**) may approximate a statement of law, it’s not maximally perspicuous.                       
There’s no reason to expect that laws could be perspicuously expressed in                       
non-canonical (including self-referential) terms. Worries about circularity and/or               
redundancy therefore don’t seem probative. 
 
6   Moral platonism 
 
Although the nomic view is attractive, it’s not the only way moral principles might be                             
explanatory in role. To illustrate, we’ll consider an alternative: ​moral platonism​.  32
Whereas the nomic view centers on the notion of a moral law, the platonist                           
view of moral explanations centers on the distinction between particular-applying                   
and kind-applying moral properties. The former are properties of ​particulars (datable,                     
non-repeatable things), while the latter are properties of ​kinds or ​types ​of things                         
(timeless things with multiple instances). Initial motivation comes from language: We                     
not only say things like ‘Matti is good’ but also things like ‘Pleasure is good.’ On the                                 
face of it, whereas the predicate ‘is good’ applies to a particular (Matti) in the former,                               
it applies to a kind ​(pleasure) in the latter. The same is true of other moral terms. That                                   
moral predicates have genuinely kind-applying senses is further supported by facts                     
about co-predication—sentences that conjoin moral predicates with predicates that                 
apply primarily, if not exclusively, to kinds (e.g. ‘Lying is wrong yet widespread’) are                           
acceptable (Skarsaune 2015, 255). 
The fact that moral predicates like ‘good’ apply both to kinds and particulars                         
is plausibly a case of polysemy—i.e. distinct but related meanings. This is supported                         
by the zeugmatic nature of sentences that apply a single predicate to both                         
31 Thanks to Martin Glazier for discussion. 
32 The platonist view is defended and motivated more fully by Skarsaune (2015)​, who also                             
discusses the linguistic motivation for it in more detail. For an earlier proposal along these                             
lines, see Forrest (1986). 
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 particular-applying and kind-applying noun phrases—‘MLK’s assassination was             
wrong, and so is lying’, for example, feels a bit like a pun (cf. Skarsaune 2015, 258). Or                                   
consider the following lists of things that are bad: 
 
KINDS: pain, suffering, unrequited love 
PARTICULARS: the pain you felt yesterday, the war in Syria, Bill’s cheating on                       
Hillary 
MIXED: pain, the pain you felt yesterday, suffering, the war in Syria,                     
unrequited love, Bill’s cheating on Hillary 
 
We find KINDS and PARTICULARS much more natural than MIXED, despite the                       
diversity of subjects within each. Indeed, the polysemy of moral predicates isn’t                       
surprising, as the distinction between particular- and kind-applying senses arises                   
with many non-normative predicates, with certain sentences being ambiguous                 
between the different readings. For example, ‘That’s a famous pen’ might be used to                           
claim that a particular ​pen is itself famous (e.g. Einstein’s Waterman pen) or merely is                             
an instance of a famous kind​ ​of pen (e.g a Fischer Space Pen). 
What is the relationship between kind- and particular-applying senses of                   
predicates? In the non-normative case, kind-applying predicates are usually                 
understood in terms of the particular-applying ones. Consider the sentence ‘There                     
was a dinosaur species that was 50 feet tall’ (Skarsaune 2015, 257). Intuitively, to say                             
that a species was 50 feet tall is to say that its adult members were (normally,                               
approximately) 50 feet tall. But Skarsaune argues that the opposite relationship holds                       
in the normative case: kind-applying predicates (and corresponding concepts) are                   
basic and particular-applying ones derivative. This broadly linguistic thesis might                   
then be taken as a guide to metaphysics, with particular-applying moral properties                       
being analyzed in terms of kind-applying ones. This gives us moral platonism. 
According to platonism, moral terms like ‘good’, ‘wrong’, and ’obligatory’                   
stand for two distinct but intimately connected properties. One property—call it                     
‘goodness​kind​’—applies to kinds or types of things. The other—call it                   
‘goodness​part​’—applies to particulars. Particular-applying moral properties are then               
metaphysically analyzed (in a sense to be explained below) in terms of more                         
fundamental kind-applying ones: for a particular thing to be good​part is just for it to be                               
a token of a good​kind ​kind; for a particular action to be wrong​part ​is just for it to be a                                       
token of a wrong​kind ​action-type; and so on. The basic moral properties are thus                           
‘second-order’—their relationship to their bearers is instantiation​, ​rather than, say,                   
necessitation (a la Armstrong 1983).  33
33 Rosen (2017: sect. 6.12) briefly considers an Armstrong-like view on which natural                         
properties like ​being a lie ​stand in a ‘normative grounding’-relation (‘M’), rather than                         
instantiation, to moral properties like ​being wrong ​(cf. Murphy 2011)​. ​The fundamental                       
moral facts have the following form: M(​being a lie, ​being wrong​)​. ​Rosen goes on to suggest                               
that the M-relation is essentially such that if such a fact obtains and particular action is a                                 
lie, then its being a lie together with lying being M-related to wrongness metaphysically                           
grounds the action’s being wrong (2017: 156). Thus, unlike platonism, Rosen’s proposal                       
focuses exclusively on particular-applying moral properties and so fails to explain the                       
application of moral terms to kinds. Worries also arise about the multiplication of                         
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 Platonism straightforwardly accommodates data points (ii) and (iii)               
concerning the role of descriptive facts and moral principles, respectively, in moral                       
explanations. The Rossian principle of Fidelity, for example, can be formulated as                       
follows (‘P’ for ‘platonism’): 
 
(PF​P​)  ​Lying is (pro tanto) wrong​kind  
 
Assuming that to be a wrong​part ​action is just to be an action of a wrong​kind kind, (PF​P​)                                   
guarantees that every instance of lying is wrong​part​. For given (PF​P​), every particular                         
lie will be an instance of a wrong​kind kind. This in turn will be explained by (a) the                                   
action’s being an instance of lying (a particular natural fact) and (b) lying being                           
wrong​kind (a general moral fact). ​This fits the basic tripartite structure of explanation                         
outlined in §3. The platonist—like the nomicist—can thus adopt a version of the D&C                           




It’s worth clarifying the notion of metaphysical analysis being appealed to in                       
describing how, given platonism, first- and second-order moral properties are related.                     
It’s sometimes thought, for example, that such analyses constitute a distinctive form                       
of metaphysical explanation, stating what ​a fact or property ‘consists in’ (as opposed                         
to, say, what they are ‘grounded’ in). Analyses are canonically expressed by sentences                         
like ‘To be ​F is to be ​G ​’ and ‘For something ​to be ​F is for it to be ​G ​’. One might agree                                             
with Plato, for instance, that to be virtuous is to have a well-ordered soul, or with                               
Aristotle’s more recent proposal that to be human is to be a rational animal. More                             
mundanely, one might think that to be a vixen is to be a female fox. 
One complication is that ‘To be ​F is to be ​G ​’ allows at least two readings. On                                 
what we’ll call the ​symmetric reading, claims of that form express ‘generalized                       
identities’ (cf. Linnebo 2014, Rayo 2014), or what Dorr (2016) calls ‘identifications’. We                         
can formalize generalized identities by introducing a ‘no-difference’ operator, ≡,                   
indexed by zero or more variables, which takes two open or closed sentences and                           





grounding-relations, since the view posits two very different kinds of such relations, one                         
of which (i.e. metaphysical) holds between facts while the other (i.e. normative) holds                         
between properties. 
34 Platonism doesn’t entail that every true sentence of the form ‘kind K is good’ states an                                 
explanatory principle. ​For instance, as Berker (p.c.) notes, if ‘Lying is pro tanto wrong’ is                             
true, then ‘Lying-on-a-Tuesday is pro tanto wrong’ is plausibly also true. But the latter                           
arguably doesn’t state an explanatory principle. While it’s hard to say exactly how the                           
relevant distinction should be drawn, this is neither surprising nor particularly                     
problematic—​[s]imilar issues arise with respect to kind-predication and property                 
inheritance more generally (cf. Liebesman and Magidor 2017). 
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 can be read as ‘For it to be the case that ​p (just) is for it to be the case that ​q​’. Similarly,                                             
where ​F​ and ​G ​ are monadic predicates, 
 
Fx ​ ≡​x​ ​Gx 
 





can be read as ‘For some things ​x,y ​,… to be such that ​p is for them to be such that ​q​’.                                         
For example, 
 
Vixen ​(​x​) ≡​x​ ​Female-fox​(​x ​)   
(For a thing to be a vixen is for it to be a female fox) 
 
Like the familiar objectual identity operator (e.g. Superman = Clark Kent), the                       
generalized identity operator is reflexive, symmetric, and transitive. The above claim                     
thus entails that: 
 
Female-fox ​(​x ​) ≡​x​ ​Vixen​(​x ​)   
(For a thing to be a female fox is for it to be a vixen) 
 
In contrast, on the ​asymmetric reading, ‘To be ​F is to be ​G ​’ expresses a general                               
grounding claim, or ‘metaphysical law’ per above. So, for example: 
 
Female(x), Fox(x) ​<<​x​ Vixen(x) 
(A thing’s being female together with its being a fox make it the case that it’s a                                 
vixen) 
 
While the word ‘reduction’ has been used in many different ways, symmetric                       
readings of ‘To be ​F is to be ​G ​’ clearly count as reductive insofar as they involve                                 
property identities (or something close). But they aren’t explanatory, given that                     
metaphysical explanation is asymmetric. In contrast, while asymmetric readings are                   
explanatory, they’re not straightforwardly reductive, since the facts related remain                   
distinct. As the vixen example illustrates, there are often identificational truths in the                         
vicinity of general grounding claims, and when there are the corresponding                     
grounding claim is natural to accept. But the grounding claim neither is nor entails an                             
identificational claim. Much the same can be said of sentences of the form ‘To be ​F is                                 
in part to be ​G​’, such as ‘To be a vixen is in part to be a fox’. On one reading, they are                                             
general statements about what partially explains what. (Vixen-facts are partially                   
explained by fox-facts.) On the other, they provide partial analyses. (For something to                         
be a vixen is in part for it to be a fox.) ​  35
35 Thus, contra Schroeder (2005, 2007) and others, we don’t think metaphysical analyses                         
constitute a distinctive, reductive form of metaphysical explanation. On one reading, the                       
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 Note that statements of generalized identities, like statements of metaphysical                   
laws, exhibit a kind of generality that entails but isn’t identical to universal                         
generalization, standardly understood. Whether they are true or false, for instance,                     
doesn’t depend on whether the left- or right-hand sides are satisfied: even if there are                             
no vixens, it’s still non-vacuously true that to be a vixen is to be a female fox. 
Distinguishing metaphysical grounding from metaphysical analysis leaves             
room for what Rydéhn (2019, ch. 3) calls ‘metaphysically opaque grounding’.                     
Simplifying slightly, this is the relation that holds when [​P ​] is the ground of [​Q​]                             
without being involved in the metaphysical analysis or essence of [​Q ​]. This possibility                         
conflicts with the commonly accepted idea that grounding guarantees a high degree                       
of metaphysical intimacy. It has been claimed, for example, that if [​P​] is the ground of                               
[​Q​], then [​Q ​] is ‘nothing over and above’ [ ​P ​]. This purported platitude is far from                             
obvious, however, and arguably rests on a conflation of explanatory and                     
identificational notions. (Compare: few people think effects are ‘nothing over and                     
above’ their causes.) Although one might think that general grounding claims, or                       
metaphysical laws, are always accompanied by identificational facts, this requires                   
argument. After all, it would seem to rule out various non-reductive metaphysical                       
theses, including versions of metaethical non-naturalism and mind-body dualism. On                   
the nomic view, for example, the non-naturalist will view natural facts as being                         
‘opaque’ grounds of particular moral facts, explaining ​why ​but not ​what it is ​for                           
particular actions to be right or wrong, good or bad, etc. 
Using the above machinery, we can formulate the platonist view of the                       
relation between particular and general facts about (e.g.) wrongness as follows: 
 
x​ is wrong​part​ ≡​x​ ​x​ is a token of a wrong​kind​ kind 
(For a particular thing to be wrong is for it to be a token of a kind that is                                     
wrong) 
 
As noted above, generalized identity statements often guarantee certain general                   
grounding claims. For example, given (PF​P​), it’s plausible that: 
 
Lying is wrong​kind​, ​x​ is an instance of lying <<​x​ ​x ​ is wrong​part 
(Lying being wrong​kind​ and ​x ​ being a lie together make it that ​x ​ is wrong​part​) 
 
This is a metaphysical law that, on the law-based view of grounding explanations,                         
does explanatory work. Moral platonism is thus compatible with the law-based view                       
of grounding explanation, though it’s a competitor to the nomic view of moral                         
explanations. The difference between platonism and the nomic view mainly concerns                     
the relation between metaphysical laws and substantive moral principles. On                   
platonism, the relevant moral principles are not metaphysical laws but rather facts                       
relevant claims are reductive but not explanatory; on the other, they are explanatory but                           
not reductive (at least not on their own). We leave open the possibility of defining                             
broader, non-identificational notions of reduction that supplement the grounding claim                   




 involving kind-applying moral properties (e.g., the principle that lying is wrong takes                       
the form [wrong​kind​(lying)]). Metaphysical laws merely connect the moral principles                   
plus the relevant natural facts with the explanandum in a transparent way. On the                           
nomic view, by contrast, the substantive moral principle is the law-like connection                       
between natural and moral facts itself (e.g. [ ​x​ is lie <<​x​ ​x​ is wrong]). 
 
7   Necessity 
 
We’ve mostly ignored the modal status of the fundamental moral principles. As noted                         
above, the D&C strategy for explaining Strong Supervenience assumes the relevant                     
principles are metaphysically necessary, and non-naturalists will insist these                 
principles are not only ​morally fundamental, but fundamental ​simpliciter ​. As a result,                       
despite making sense of supervenience, they’ll still be committed to there being ​some                         
brute necessary ‘connections’ between the natural and non-natural. This is hardly                     36
surprising—it’s simply the bullet non-naturalists bite. Nonetheless, at least two things                     
can be said in closing. 
First, although non-naturalism will (unsurprisingly) violate various ‘Humean’               
metaphysical principles, the details matter. Take, for instance, the so-called ‘Modest                     
Humean’ principle that “[c]ommitment to brute necessary connections between                 
discontinuous properties counts significantly against a view” (McPherson 2012). Very                   
different things might be meant by ‘connections’—at a minimum, we should                     
distinguish co-occurrence (iff), general ‘making’ (<<​x​) and instantiation (is). If the                     
non-naturalist was forced to accept the necessary co-occurrence of particular moral                     
and natural facts as brute, that would be bad. But they don’t—as we’ve seen, they can                               
make sense of such co-occurrence, and hence supervenience, by appeal to                     
explanatory-in-role moral principles. Whatever worries that remain won’t be worries                   
about ​supervenience ​—they’ll be about something else.  37
Another important issue concerns the sense in which the fundamental moral                     
principles obtain ‘of (metaphysical) necessity’. We think that, given certain                   
assumptions about possible worlds, it’s plausible for naturalists and non-naturalists                   
alike to view the relevant principles as being ​transcendental ​in the sense of Fine (2005,                             
ch. 9), not (merely) necessary. The intuitive idea is that transcendental truths obtain                         
independently of​—rather than ​in ​—all worlds. Merely necessary truths, in contrast,                   
depend on how things turn out in each world, coming out true every time. For                             
example, seven’s being prime is plausibly transcendental, while a truth like ​P∨¬P is                         
merely necessary—in some worlds it’s true because ​P is while in others it’s true                           
because ​¬P​ is.  
36 We take Shafer-Landau’s (2003) view that instances of moral properties are fully                         
constituted by natural ones to be a form of naturalism, just as the view that instances of                                 
mental properties are fully constituted by physical properties is a form of physicalism (cf.                           
Väyrynen 2017). 
37 We’re not suggesting that positing general explanatory principles is a metaphysical                       
get-out-of-jail-free card. What’s needed is independent support for positing them, which                     
there is in the moral case. 
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 The distinction between transcendental and merely necessary truths requires                 
a more restrictive notion of necessity and truth-in-a-world than is standard. On Fine’s                         
alternative conception, a possible world is not to be viewed as a “totality of facts, or of                                 
how things might ​be​, but [instead as] the totality of circumstances, or of how things                             
might ​turn out​” (2005, 325). While the totality of circumstances (roughly, substances                       
and their properties and relations) varies between worlds, the transcendental facts                     
form “the invariable framework within which the variation takes place” (325-6). Put                       
in terms of logical form, while transcendental truths entail necessitated (or ‘box’-ed)                       
ones, they aren’t themselves necessitated. 
Like Fine, we doubt there’s a need to choose between the more restrictive                         
modal concepts and the more expansive ones. Different modal notions may be useful                         
for different purposes. However, when it comes to the modal status of many                         
philosophical theses—including fundamental moral principles—we think the more               
fine-grained concepts are most suitable. The analogies between morality and                   
mathematics help illustrate this point. According to Ross (1930), for example, “[t]he                       
moral order… is just as much part of the fundamental nature of the universe [and, we                               
may add, of any possible universe…] as is the spatial or numerical structure                         
expressed in the axioms of geometry or arithmetic” (29-30). We doubt Ross is best                           
interpreted as claiming that the relevant moral and mathematical facts are merely                       
necessary—i.e. dependent on the circumstances in each world and coming out true                       
every time. Rather, they are transcendental, obtaining independently of such                   
circumstances and forming part of the framework in which the worlds play out. 
Of course, whatever worries one might have about principles that are                     
necessary in the broader, undifferentiated sense will likely carry over to principles                       
viewed as transcendental. The appeal to transcendence is not intended to assuage                       
such worries. The point is merely to shed additional light on how the view that such                               
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